In private nuisance, the remedy beyond stopping the nuisance is compensatory damages for the actual harm caused by the interference. Even when a court issues an injunction to stop the loud music, the harmed neighbor can recover money to make up for real losses from the disturbance—such as sleep deprivation, lost use of the property, or any reduction in enjoyment or value of the home due to the ongoing noise. Punitive damages aren’t the standard here unless there’s something exceptionally malicious or willful about the conduct, which is not typical in ordinary nuisance cases. Nominal damages would only apply if no actual harm were shown, which isn’t the situation when the neighbor has suffered real disturbance. Updated property tax credits don’t fit as a remedy in tort.

Power lines are a dangerous instrumentality, and the company that controls them has a duty to exercise reasonable care to keep them in a safe condition for the public. If the insulators were repeatedly destroyed, the company has notice of a persistent risk that the lines could fall. In that situation, it must take reasonable steps to prevent the hazard—such as repairing or replacing components, increasing inspections, or securing the lines. If it could have taken such steps but did not, that breach of duty makes the company liable for injuries caused by the downed line. This is negligence, not strict liability. Strict liability would apply only in limited circumstances involving abnormally dangerous activities, which isn’t prompted by simply having a dangerous instrumentality that could have been managed with reasonable care. Warnings alone are not enough when there are reasonable precautions that could have prevented the harm, and the hazard isn’t considered unavoidable if preventive steps were available.

The key idea is the scope of a lifeguard’s duty. A lifeguard is responsible for supervising and protecting swimmers within the designated swimming area. If a swimmer voluntarily leaves that area, the lifeguard’s duty to warn or supervise the swimmer in that context generally ends because the risk now lies outside the protected zone and the swimmer has assumed it. Here, the swimmer knowingly stepped out of the roped area to join a volleyball game, and the lifeguard did not warn him to return. Since the swimmer left the safe zone, the lifeguard’s failure to warn does not breach a duty. The injuries occurred outside the lifeguard’s duty-bound area, so there’s no liability. Choosing a broader duty to supervise all swimmers or a broader duty to warn those outside the area would be inaccurate; the duty is tied to the designated safe zone, and the swimmer’s voluntary departure ends that specific duty. If the swimmer had stayed inside and the lifeguard failed to warn or protect him, that could be different.

Respondeat superior makes the employer vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the course and scope of employment. Here, the bus driver injures a pedestrian while performing duties—driving the bus is part of the job, and the harm occurs in the work context. That places the act within the scope of employment, so the employer is liable. The other statements aren’t correct because liability depends on whether the act was within the scope; it isn’t automatic regardless of scope, and authorization by the employer isn’t a gatekeeping requirement—being within the scope is enough for liability, while acts clearly outside the scope might not trigger it.