When a contract is formed, the usual privity rule has expanded to let certain third parties sue to enforce promises made for their benefit. The key distinction is between intended beneficiaries and incidental beneficiaries. If the contract is intended to benefit a third party—either as a creditor beneficiary (the promisor owes money to the third party) or as a donee beneficiary (the promisee intends to confer a benefit on the third party)—that third party can sue the promisor for breach even though there’s no contract between them and the promisor. If the third party is only incidental to the contract, they cannot sue. Novation isn’t required for this right to arise; novation would substitute a new party in place of an original one, which is a separate concept. The take-away is that modern contract law recognizes standing for certain third-party beneficiaries to enforce the contract, so rights have expanded to allow those beneficiaries to sue.

Under the UCC, performance in a sale of goods is excused or justified primarily by whether a breach is material. A buyer’s failure to select by a specified deadline is a breach, but it isn’t automatically fatal—the breach must be material to justify cancellation or a seller’s refusal. Here, a one-day delay in the buyer’s selection does not materially affect the seller’s ability to perform or the contract’s value. Because the delay is not material, the seller’s one-day refusal to proceed is not a proper basis to cancel. In that sense, the buyer is likely to prevail on a breach claim by the seller, since the delay did not cause the seller substantial harm. Anticipatory repudiation doesn’t come into play—the scenario doesn’t involve a party clearly stating it will not perform before the deadline. And the argument that the seller had no right to cancel is too strong when the breach is material; here the breach is not material, so cancellation isn’t clearly justified. The key idea is that nonmaterial delays don’t automatically excuse or justify cancellation under the UCC.

The key idea is that certification under Rule 23 hinges on a shared issue among all class members. There must be a common contention—an issue of fact or law—that is central to every member’s claim and that can be resolved through one class-wide determination. This commonality ensures the suit will be more efficient and that named plaintiffs can adequately represent the interests of the whole group. Jurisdiction isn’t a class-certification criterion; it’s about the court’s authority to hear the case. Standing concerns who may sue in the first place, not whether a class can be certified. Damages aren’t required for certification—the class can be certified even if damages vary or are difficult to prove on an individual basis. The essential requirement for certification is the presence of a common issue binding all class members.

Miranda warnings are triggered only when a suspect is in custody and being interrogated. A Terry stop is a brief, noncoercive detention based on reasonable suspicion to investigate possible criminal activity. While the stop is ongoing, officers may question to determine if there’s danger or involvement, but the person is not considered “in custody” for Miranda purposes in the same way as a formal arrest. Because of that, routine questions during a permissible Terry stop do not require Miranda warnings. If the stop leads to a formal arrest or the detainee is otherwise placed in custody, then before any interrogation about the crime, officers must administer Miranda warnings. And if the suspect requests counsel, questioning must stop until counsel is present.