Under FRE 703, an expert may base an opinion on facts or data presented to the expert, even if those facts or data would be inadmissible as evidence at trial. The key is that the data must be of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions. So hearsay can be used as the basis for an expert’s opinion, even though the hearsay itself isn’t admissible to prove the truth at trial. The court ensures the data is something experts in the field typically rely on, and the underlying information may be kept out of the jury room unless it’s admitted for another reason. This allows experts to bring in practical, real-world information they consider credible, without forcing the jury to review every underlying source.

The main idea is how liens on real property are prioritized when foreclosure proceeds are distributed. A properly filed judgment creates a lien on all real property owned by the judgment debtor, so it attaches to any property, including the garage, not just the hotel. When the garage mortgage is foreclosed, the sale proceeds are applied first to liens on the garage property in order of priority determined by their filing/recording dates. If the judgment lien was filed before the garage mortgage, it has priority over that mortgage on the garage property, so the funds from the garage foreclosure would be applied to satisfy the hotel bank’s judgment first. Only after that would any remaining proceeds go to the garage lender. Hence, the proceeds go to the hotel bank to satisfy its judgment.

This question tests the use of res ipsa loquitur and whether the plaintiff can get the case to a jury based on the facts given. For res ipsa to work, three things must be shown: the injury-causing condition is of a type that ordinarily wouldn’t occur without negligence, the instrumentality causing the injury is under the defendant’s exclusive control, and the plaintiff’s evidence permits an inference that the defendant knew or should have known about the danger (i.e., there’s no other reasonable explanation). In this scenario, the banana peel on the floor is the dangerous condition, but the facts don’t establish exclusive control by the grocer or a duty to have known about the peel. The peel is described as fresh and unblemished except for a mark from the customer’s heel, which suggests the peel may have been left by a shopper or could have been walked on by the same or another shopper. There’s no evidence the grocer knew of the peel, nor that the grocer’s agents had exclusive control over it at a time when it would ordinarily be avoided or noticed. Without showing the grocer’s knowledge or a reliable basis to infer negligent maintenance, res ipsa loquitur cannot properly be invoked, so the case shouldn’t be sent to the jury on that theory. The other options rely on theories or duties that aren’t supported by the facts: assuming an inspection-duty or implying knowledge of a dangerous condition without evidence of notice would be speculative, and simply asserting a general duty to maintain premises isn’t enough without showing breach or notice.

The key idea is that a conspiracy is a partnership in a crime that can continue even if one member is temporarily removed from the scene. Two or more people must agree to commit an unlawful act, and acts in furtherance of that plan can sustain the conspiracy across time. If one conspirator is jailed on unrelated charges, the remaining conspirators can still carry on the plan, and their ongoing actions during the period in question can support a conviction for conspiracy. The jailed conspirator’s absence does not automatically dissolve the agreement or prevent the others from being found guilty, as long as there is evidence of the original conspiracy and continued participation by at least two conspirators. In this scenario, the fact that the last six robberies occurred while the conspirator was incarcerated doesn’t negate the conspiracy; the remaining conspirators can still be convicted for their role in continuing the plan.